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International Extradition: Issues Arising Under
the Dual Criminality Requirement

Because of the increase in international drug trafficking,
extradition law has become increasingly important in recent
years. One of the most fundamental, yet least understood, requirements of extradition is that the offense charged by the
State requesting extradition be considered criminal by both the
requesting State and the requested State. This is known as the
dual criminality requirement.' This comment reviews the historical background of the dual criminality requirement, analyzes current problems arising under the requirement, and submits a proposal for change.
AND PRESENT STATEOF THE
11. THE PAST
DUALCRIMINALITY
REQUIREMENT

The dual criminality requirement has undergone a tremendous change in the last 100 years. In the late nineteenth century the requirement was intended t o force a requested State to
justify its denial of an extradition request in order to protect
the individual facing extradition from unjust prosecution. However, in this century dual criminality has become an unwanted
barrier t o extradition to both requesting and requested States.
In order to relegate this barrier to a background position in the
extradition process, courts are recognizing ever-expanding scenarios in which the elements of the requirement may be satisfied. Similarly, parties who negotiate treaties, especially in the
last ten years, have made it clear that the dual criminality
requirement is t o be a barrier to extradition only when the requested State so desires. The liberalization of the dual criminality requirement-especially by the twentieth century Unit1. SATYAD. BEDI, EXTRADITION
IN ~NTERNATIONAI, LAW AND PRACTICE 179
(1968) (
Thisrule of double criminality is one of the most essential ingredients in
the proceedings for extradition of the fugitives who have taken refuge in the
territory of the requested state and are apprehended therein."). Dual criminality is
also referred to as 'double criminality." For consistency's sake, I will refer to it as
'dual criminality." However, if a source refers to the principle as "double criminality," it will not be altered.
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ed States' court system-is best understood in light of the
changing political contexts in which the requirement has been
invoked. This comment explores these shifting political winds
and analyzes the judicial response to the increased desire for a
weaker dual criminality requirement.

A. The Historical Context of the Dual
Criminality Requirement
Extradition in various forms has existed for thousands of
years.2 The earliest recorded extradition provision is found in
the 1280 B.C. peace treaty between the Egyptian Pharaoh,
Rameses 11, and the Hittite Prince, Hattulisi IIL3 Professor
Shearer points out that "[tlreaties including provision for the
surrender of criminals are recorded in succeeding eras of history, but the actual extent to which regular surrender of common
criminals was conducted before the eighteenth century A.D. is
a matter of some controver~y.~
From the beginning of its use, extradition has been largely
a foreign relations tool, intended to foster goodwill among
neighboring nations. Professor Bassiouni, perhaps the greatest
living authority on international extradition, stated the following about the relationship between extradition and foreign
relations:
Because the requested and requesting participants are
states it is clear that there is a nexus between the interests of
those respective states and the granting or denial of extradition. In fact, the whole history of extradition has been little
more than a reflection of the political relations between the
states in question. This explains why whenever a state main-

2.
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION
AND WORLDPUBLIC
ORDER1 (1974). Professor Bassiouni reported that ''[tlhe practice originated in
earlier non-Western civilizations such as the Egyptian, Chinese, Chaldean, and
Assyro-Babylonian civilizations." Id. (citing Luis Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and
International Extradition, 41 U. Dm. L.J. 525 (1964)).
3.
IVAN A. SHEARER,
EXTRADITION
IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW5 (1971).
4.
Id. This controversy concerns whether extradition requests focused only on
political offenders or if they included common criminals as well. Scholars have
postulated that early extradition was limited to political offenders. See, e.g., EDWARD CURKE, A '~'REATIsE
UPON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION
18-22 (4th ed. 1903).
However, more recent academic efforts show that there were a large number of
early extradition requests for fugitives from common crimes as well as political offenses. See, e.g., Paul O'Higgins, The History of Extradition in British Practice, 13
INDIAN Y.B. I ~ fAFF.
i 78-115 (1964).
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tained in its relations with another state a certain degree of
formality, extradition was bound in solemn formulas and
treaties, but whenever relations between the interested states
were informal other informal modes of rendition were resorted to as a sign of cordial cooperation.'

Such political concerns have remained a primary motivation behind extradition. However, there are some major differences between extradition in ancient times and modern extradition. As international communication and awareness increased,
many nations became concerned about the treatment of extradited individuals. Preservation of fundamental human rights of
the fugitive became an important factor for many nations considering extradition requests. Because each nation had different standards concerning the treatment of criminals, a complex
web of procedural requirements surrounding modern extradition arose to ensure that a fugitive would not be prosecuted for
an act not considered criminal by both nations or for acts not
falling within the scope of the extradition treaty. These requirements began blooming in the late eighteenth century and continued t o develop throughout the nineteenth century?
Because the welfare of the individual facing extradition
was the foundation of this procedural proliferation, protecting
the individual's rights became a customary practice. Professor
Bassiouni commented that "[tlhe emergence of humanitarian
international law gave rise to a new legal status to one of the
participants, i.e., the individual, thus, placing some limitations
on the power of the respective sovereigns."' Therefore, the procedural prerequisites to granting extradition gradually
achieved the status of international law.
Perhaps the most significant prerequisite that took shape
during the nineteenth century, and continues to exist today, is
5.
BASSIOUNI,
supra note 2, at 3.
6. SHEARER,
supra note 3, at 13-16.
supra note 2, at 2. Wumanitarian international law" refers to a
7. BASSIOUNI,
growing collection of international laws designed to protect universally recognized
human rights. An example of such a right is fieedom h m torture. For other
M.
examples and a more detailed discussion of this body of law, see JOSEPH
SWEENEY ET AL., CASESAND MATERIALSON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGALS Y ~ M
579-732 (3d ed. 1988); see also BEDI, supra note 1, at 69 ("[Tlhe liberty of an
individual is not something which can be disposed of indiscriminately in the
absence of a positive law; therefore, a state cannot detain or apprehend the person
sought for extradition unless the evidence submitted by the requesting state justifies prima facie judicial proceedings against the accused.")(citation omitted).
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the dual criminality doctrine. Dual criminality prevents extradition of an individual unless the requesting State can show
that the individual committed an act which constituted a
"crime according to the laws of both the requesting and the
requested state^."^ The dual criminality requirement in United
States extradition jurisprudence has its roots in the Jay Treaty
of 1794. This treaty concerned extradition requests between the
United States and Great Britain, but its provisions were substantially adopted in other treaties.' The standardization of
dual criminality began with Britain's Extradition Act of 1870.
Following the adoption of this statute, many other nations
passed legislation patterned after the British statute.'' Today,
some form of the dual criminality requirement is found in nearly all bilateral and multilateral extradition treaties."
The almost universal recognition of dual criminality has
made it a well-settled part of customary international law.12
Therefore, any State wishing t o request extradition must indicate compliance with the dual criminality requirement. The
requested State bears the burden of ascertaining whether the
conduct considered criminal in the requesting State is also
criminal in the requested State.13
In addition to protecting a fugitive from unjust punishment, the dual criminality requirement serves other important
purposes:
[Tlhe double criminality rule serves the most important function of ensuring that a person's liberty is not restricted as a
consequence of offences not recognized as criminal by the
requested State. The social conscience of a State is also not
embarrassed by an obligation to extradite a person who would
not, according to its own standards, be guilty of acts deservb g punishment. So far as the reciprocity principle is con-

8.
SHEARER,supra note 3, at 137.
9. See Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (1st Cir. 1980) ("The requirement
that the ads alleged be criminal in both jurisdictions is central to extradition law
and has been embodied either explicitly or implicitly in all prior extradition
treaties between the United States and Great Britain since the Jay Treaty of
1794.").
10. SHEARER,supra note 3, at 15.
11. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION:
UNITEDSTATESLAW
AND PRACTICE326-27 (2d ed. 1987).
12. Id.
13. In the United States, the federal district courts generally have the burden
of answering this question.
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cerned, the rule ensures that a State is not required to extradite categories of offenders for which it, in return, would never have occasion to make demand. The point is by no means
an academic one even in these days. of growing uniformity of
standards . . . .I4

The ability of the dual criminality requirement to serve
these purposes may depend on the form it is given in the applicable extradition treaty. Some treaties and laws add certain
embellishments to the dual criminality requirement which
expand or limit the scope of the doctrine. For example, a treaty
or law may require that the conduct of the individual facing
extradition be not only criminal, but also rise to the level of a
serious rime.'^ Other treaties and laws require a showing
that the conduct constitutes a n extraditable crime, i.e., a crime
which is listed in the treaty as one justifying extradition.16
Obviously, a firm grasp on all of the possible dual criminality
subtleties may be difficult to obtain.
With the wide variety of possible dual criminality required
ments, generalization is difficult. Nevertheless, Whiteman
made the following attempt:
A common requirement for extradition is that the acts which
form the basis for the extradition request constitute a crime

14. SHEARER,
supra note 3, at 137-38.
15. The "seriousness" of a crime is often determined by the minimum sentence
which a person could receive if convicted of the crime. See, e.g., Treaty between
the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning
art. 11, q[ 2, 32 U.S.T. 1485, 1489-90
Extradition, June 20, 1978, U.S.-F.R.G.,
(mandating that extradition is possible only if (a) "the offense is punishable under
the laws of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of liberty for a maximum
period exceeding one year, or (b) the enforcement of a penalty or a detention order,
if the duration of the penalty or the detention order still to be served, or when, in
the aggregate, several such penalties or detention orders still to be served, amount
to at least six months.").
16. This requirement is a correlary of dual criminality, but is handled separately by most courts. See, e.g., United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1465
(11th Cir. 1988) (showing that extraditable offense and dual criminality requirements are treated separately), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1027 (1989); Emami v. United
States, 834 F.2d 1444, 1449 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Extradition of Rabelbauer, 638
F. Supp. 1085, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The doctrines interrelate because under many
extradition treaties the offense must be considered extraditable by both nations in
order to fully satisfy the dual criminality requirement. Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d
1336, 1343 (9th Cir. 1981) ("No offense is extraditable unless it is criminal in
both jurisdictions."); Emami, 834 F.2d at 1449 (citing Caplan for the principle that
the offense must be extraditable in both jurisdictions in order for dual criminality
to be satisfied).
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under the law of both the requesting and the requested
States. This requirement exists whether the request is made
under a treaty or apart from a treaty and whether a list of offenses or a minimum-penalty provision is involved. In the
case of a treaty or a law providing for extradition for offenses
punishable by at least a certain minimum penalty, specific
provision is usually made that the offense must be a crime in
both States. Where a list of offenses involved is in the treaty
or the law, a specific provision on the point is less common.
However, even in the absence of a specific provision, the requirement is generally imposed. The question whether the
requirement has been met generally arises with regard to the
law of the requested State, and where the requirement is
covered by a specific provision in the law or treaty it is often
cast only in terms of the law of the requested State, since, if a
State requests extradition, it must base its request on an
alleged violation of its law. It might be supposed that if two
States agree, in a treaty, to a list of offenses for which extradition shall take place, they would include only those acts
which are crimes in both States. However, questions nevertheless may arise. Certain acts may, under the law of the
requesting State, constitute a listed treaty offense while,
under the law of the requested State, the same acts may
constitute no crime or, more frequently, one not listed in the
treaty."

Needless to say, courts in this country and elsewhere have
had a Micult time determining the scope of the dual criminality requirement. Despite the confusion, a clear trend toward a
more permissive reading of the requirement has taken place
throughout the course of this century. Courts began to defer to
executive decisions regarding the desireability of extradition,

17.

MARJORIEM. W ~ M A N6, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 773-74 (1968),

quoted in BASSIOUNI,supra note 11, at 330. Professor Shearer argues that dual

criminality is no longer dual criminality but is dual extraditability. This argument
is based on the notion that dual criminality no longer requires simply that the
offense be criminal in both countries, but also that the offense be listed in the respective treaty as an extraditable offense fitting a set list of requirements-such as
that the offense is a serious crime or is on a list of extraditable crimes found
within the treaty. SHEARER,
supra note 3, at 138. This would explain the significant overlap between the two fundamental extradition requirements of dual criminality and an extraditable offense. The extraditable offense requirement is beyond
the scope of this paper, although Professor Whiteman appears to try to disentangle
the two requirements in the excerpt above.

1911
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due both to the increasing complexity of ascertaining violations
of two nations' laws and judicial recognition of the executive's
role in establishing foreign policy. More recently, the increase
in international crimes such as drug traf'ficking and terrorism
have added a new urgency to allowing extradition whenever
possible.
Even so, the dual criminality requirement continues to
present a potential obstacle to both requesting and requested
states, even when both nations support a decision to extradite.
Because resources are more accommodating to a study of how
and why United States courts have liberalized the interpretation of the requirement-and because a worldwide survey
would be impossiblewhat follows is an analysis of the major
dual criminality decisions in the United States since the turn of
the century.''

B. The Liberalization of the Dual
Criminality Requirement
During the nineteenth century, United States courts developed a substantial body of extradition jurisp~dence.'~
During
that time, American courts determined compliance with the
dual criminality requirement by attempting to ascertain whether the offense constituted a crime under the laws of the requesting State as well as the requested State. Such a process
worked well a t the time. As one late nineteenth century commentator, Sir Edward Clarke, noted in 1874:
In the matter of extradition, the American law was, until
1870, better than that of any country in the world; and the
decisions of the American judges are the best existing expositions of the duty of extradition, in its relations at once to the
judicial rights of nations and the general interests of the
civilisation [sic] of the

But as criminal codes in other countries grew more complex,
United States courts began having a difficult time determining
18.
These are extradition decisions in which the United States is the requested
State, and some other nation is the requesting State. These decisions are the focus
of commentary and the foundation for nearly all recent decisions regarding dual
criminality.
19.
SHEARER,
supra note 3, at 16.
EDWARD
CLARKE,
A TREATISE
UPON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION
28-29 (2d ed.
20.
1874), quoted in SHEARER,
supra note 3, at 16.
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whether conduct was criminal in foreign jurisdi~tions.~~
Professor Shearer remarked that because judges were often totally
unfamiliar with the practices and traditions of foreign jurisprudence, it quickly became apparent that attempting to engage in
a process of comparative criminal law was "an uncertain judicial voyage" on which United States courts were "ill-equipped
t o embark?' Other courts around the world faced similar dWi~ulties.'~
As courts began to recognize these difficulties, the strictly
comparative interpretation began to give way to looser interpretations of the dual criminality requirement. A series of United States Supreme Court decisions during the first half of
this century reflects this new standard? Consequently, some
United States courts now virtually assume that the offense
constitutes a crime in foreign jurisdictions and focus instead on
whether the conduct constitutes a crime under United States
law.25This is but one aspect of the liberalization of the dual
John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO.L.J.
21.
1441, 1460 (1988).
22.
SHEARER,
supra note 3, at 139; see also Kester, supra note 21, at 1460
("Most United States judges and attorneys . . . have no expertise in comparative
law, particularly in its esoteric subcategory of comparative criminal law . . . . Our
courts usually are not comfortable with what appear to be overly refined arguments that seek to distinguish between the elements of United States crimes and
their foreign counterparts.").
23.
Dual criminality was especially problematic for foreign courts considering
U.S. extradition requests because the U.S. requests were often based on complex
criminal statutes such as RICO and CCE. These statutes are uniquely American,
having no foreign counterparts. Thus, a strict interpretation of the dual criminality
requirement by foreign courts would make extradition impossible even when public
policy dictated a contrary result. See infia notes 67-89 and accompanying text.
Courts in the United States have faced similar problems when considering other
nations' drug and terrorism prevention legislation.
See infia notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
For example, the Tenth Circuit stated:
While on its face the doctrine of dual criminality seems to require a
MI-blown inquiry into both the question of whether the alleged acts
would violate American law and the question of whether the alleged acts
constitute a violation of the British statutes, we think that an extensive
investigation of British law would be inappropriate. For one thing, we
"are not expected to become experts in the laws of foreign nations."
Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713, 716 (10th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). For an
extreme example of a court all but ignoring the dual criminality requirement, see
United States v. Deaton, 448 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (After looking at the
purposes of the dual criminality requirement, and finding that the conduct constituted a crime under United States law, the court decided that it was "unnecessary
to look for a counterpart in the criminal law of West Germany."). Id. at 536, a f d ,
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criminality requirement, but it signifies the twentieth century
trend toward the deferential in abstracto method of dual crirninality interpretation rather than the more probing inquiries of
the traditional in concreto method. Clearly the policy underlying this change is the desire to rebalance the individual rights
of the accused in light of a worldwide effort to suppress international crimes. A review of this shift in methodology, and the
United States Supreme Court decisions underlying the change,
follows.

1. In concreto and in abstracto methods of interpreting the
dual criminality requirement
The most sigdicant liberalization of dual criminality in
the United States concerned the method used to apply the dual
criminality requirement to the facts of a specific case. Historically, two different approaches have been used to interpret the
requirement: in concreto or in abstracto. Under the in concreto
method, the courts rely on the label of the domestic crime and
apply a strict analysis of its elements to the parallel law of the
requesting State. If the laws match, the court then applies the
domestic law to the actions of the party facing extradition."
In other words, if the crime for which the requesting State
wishes to prosecute does not have an exact domestic corollary-including identical elements-then the request for extradition will be turned down.
A court applying the in abstracto standard, by contrast, reviews the criminality of the conduct regardless of the label and
597 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1979). Kester cited this case as a "particularly egregious
example of a court ignoring the requirement of dual criminality." Kester, supra
note 21, at 1460.
Some foreign courts have liberalized the dual criminality requirement by asking
not whether the conduct is an offense under laws of the requested State, but instead whether the conduct is an offense under the laws of the requesting State.
See, e.g., United States v. Link & Green, 21 I.L.R. 234 (Que. 1954). In this case
the Supreme Court of Quebec granted the request of the United States to extradite
two fugitives fleeing Michigan indictments on charges of forgery and obtaining
money by false pretenses. Professor Bassiouni commented that the "unusual feature
of this case is that the issue was not whether the offense charged constituted . . .
an offense in the requested state but whether it was an offense under the laws of
the requesting state." BASSIOUNI,supm note 2, at 345.
S.Z. Feller, The Significance of the Requirement of Double Criminali6y in the
26.
Law of Extrudition, 10 ISR. L. REV.51, 66-76 (1975) (providing a general discussion
of the concepts of in abstntcto and in concreto interpretation of the dual criminality
requirement).
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elements of the alleged crime.27Under this standard, the conduct must simply be criminal in both jurisdictions; no parallel
offense is required. Although United States courts adhered to
the in concreto interpretation prior to the turn of the century,
since that time the United States has become a solidly in abstract~j urisdiction?
The first case which signalled the United States' shift from
one interpretational extreme toward the other was Wright v.
Henkel?9 Wright involved a request by the British government
to extradite a man who had participated in a fraudulent
scheme in England and then fled to New York. The extraditable offense listed in the treaty was fraud. The problem arose
from the fact that the elements for a prima facie case of fraud
differed in the two jurisdictions, raising dual criminality concerns. The elements of the English version of the crime differed
only slightly from a similar New York provision. Nevertheless,
the defendant, Wright, claimed that his extradition was precluded by the dual criminality requirement. In rejecting Wright's claim, the Court noted that the elements of the British
and United States version of the crime were different but held
that because the two were "substantially analogous," the dual
criminality requirement had been satisfied.s0
The next major case addressing the dual criminality requireRather than reining in the exment was Collins v. Loi~el.~'
pansive reading of the dual criminality requirement taken by
the Court in Wright, the Collins Court continued the trend. In
Collins, the defendant allegedly made a promise he never intended to keep in exchange for a pearl button. The British
crime for such action was known as cheating, while the analogous U.S. crime was obtaining property by false pretenses.
Collins argued that cheating was not among the offenses listed
as extraditable in the treaty between the U.S. and Great Britain and that the crime of cheating was a different offense than
obtaining property by false pretenses.s2 Specifically he claimed
that "to convict of cheating it is sufficient to prove a promise of
future performance which the promisor does not intend to per27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

BASSIOW, supra note 2, at 322.
See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
190 U.S. 40 (1903).
Id. at 58.
259 U.S. 309 (1922).
Id. at 311.
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form, while to convict of obtaining property by false pretense it
is essential that there be a false representation of a state of
things past or present."33 In response to this argument, the
Court held that
[tlhe law does not require that the name by which the crime
is described in the two countries shall be the same; nor that
the scope of the liability shall be coextensive, or, in other
respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if the
particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions."

This language altered the Wrght test by no longer requiring that the two versions of the alleged crime be substantially
analogous. Instead, the conduct simply had to be considered
criminal under any state or federal law in both jurisdictions.
Although this case represents an extension of the requesting
State's powers to extradite, it arguably comports with a common sense interpretation of the dual criminality doctrine. If the
dual criminality doctrine means what its title suggests, then
evidence that the conduct is criminal in both jurisdictions
should be enough to assure the requested State that extradition is justified. However, there is a potential problem with this
approach. If the requesting State has a very low standard of
proof with a very high penalty for conviction when compared'
with the standards and penalties of the requested State, the
rights of the individual may be in jeopardy.35 Nevertheless,
the policies underlying the trend toward liberalization favor the
needs of nations rather than individuals. Thus, this concern did
not trouble the Court in Wright.
The next step in liberalizing the judicial interpretation of
the dual criminality requirement was taken in Factor v.
Laubenhei~ner.~~
Like Wright and Collins, Factor involved an
extradition request from Great Britain. The defendant in Factor allegedly had committed the British crime of receiving stolen property. In an incredibly broad reading of the dual criminality requirement, the Court held that even though the asylum state of Illinois did not consider the defendant's conduct
33.
Id.
34.
Id. at 312.
35.
For a discussion of potential problems caused by different standards of
criminal procedure and punishment, see Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894,
908-09 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973).
36.
290 U.S. 276 (1933).
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criminal, the dual criminality requirement was nevertheless
satisfied because the conduct constituted a crime under the
laws of the majority of other states. The Court also stated that
treaties should be liberally applied to effectuate the intent of
the parties. Therefore, because the dual criminality requirement was not specifically stated in the treaty between the
United States and Great Britain, the Court reasoned that the
requirement should not act as a barrier to extradition. Bassiouni correctly notes that the Treaty actually did contain the
dual criminality requirement, but the specific extraditable
offense at issue in the case did not restate the requirement.
Because of this, the Court determined that while the dual criminality requirement may apply to some parts of the Treaty, it
did not apply to the offense in Factor?
If the Court simply wished to permit the extradition request, it could have taken an easier path. For example, as
Justice Butler noted in his dissent, the conduct engaged in by
the defendant could have been construed as criminal under
several provisions of Illinois law:
[Tlhe record shows [that the defendant] was a party to the
fraud by which the money was obtained, and that, as obtaining by false pretenses and participation in that offense are
both criminal in Illinois and extraditable, it must be held that
that extradition of the petitioner would be within the rule.
The court [sic] does not take that point, and therefore it need
not be considered here. It is mentioned for the purpose of disclosing the principal, if not indeed the sole, ground upon
which extradition is now claimed.38

Because the defendant's conduct would have been considered
criminal under the laws of both jurisdictions, the test proclaimed in Collins would have been met.39But rather than staying
with the previously articulated standard, the Court instead
chose to open up new ground, expanding the dual criminality
test almost beyond recognition. The Court justified itself by
37.
BASSIOUNI,
supm note 11, at 338. What Factor in effect required was that
the treaty contain the dual criminality requirement provision within each listed
extraditable offense in order for that requirement to preclude extradition. By so
doing, the Court ignored the previous precedent which had held that the dual
criminality requirement was a part of customary international law and therefore
implicit throughout all treaties. See id. at 327, 338.
38.
Factor, 290 U.S. at 308, quoted by SHEARER,
supra note 3, at 145.
39.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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stating:
The obligation to do what some nations have done voluntarily, in the interest of justice and friendly international
relationships . . . should be construed more liberally than a
criminal statute or the technical requirements of criminal
procedure . . . . It has been the policy of our own government,
as of others, in entering into extradition treaties, to name as
treaty offenses only those generally recognized as criminal by
the laws in force within its own territory. But that policy
when camed into effect by treaty designation of offenses with
respect to which extradition is to be granted, affords no adequate basis for declining to construe the treaty in accordance
with its language, or for saying that its obligation, in the
absence of some express requirement, is conditioned on the
criminality of the offense charged according to the laws of the
particular place of a s y l ~ m . ~

From this statement, one can discern that the Court found that
the policies behind interpreting treaties broadly outweigh those
supporting a strict application of the dual criminality requirement.
As pointed out by Professor Bassiouni, the problem with an
approach as broad as Factor's is that it in essence ignores dual
criminality altogether: "[Factor] illustrates . . . that a broad [in
abstract01 interpretation of. . . double criminality leads to the
same result as its nonapplicability when it is coupled with a
broad interpretation of what constitutes the requirement of
extraditable offenses.""' However, if the policy goal underlying
the modern dual criminality requirement is to strike a new
balance between individual rights and the worldwide effort to
combat international crime, then the Factor approach may give
courts the necessary latitude to weigh and balance each of
these important interests.
Some lower courts have since rejected the Factor interpretation as overly broad and have instead looked to the Collins
standard which requires that the particular acts must simply
be criminal in both jurisdictions? Other courts cite Factor as

40. 290 U.S. at 298-300 (citations omitted), quoted in BASSIOUNI,supm note 11,
at 338.
41. BASSIOUNI,supra note 11, at 339.
42.
Because Factor did not explicitly overrule Collins, some lower courts have
chosen to apply CoUins without even acknowledging Factor. See, e.g., United States

204 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992

authority for the principle that treaties should be construed
liberally but rely on Wright and Collins for dual criminality
precedent." Some lower courts have even returned exclusively
to the Wright standard, which requires that the codification of
the conduct as a crime in the two jurisdictions be "substantially
analogous.'^
2. Liberalization through choice of law
Choice of law issues have also troubled courts seeking to
interpret the dual criminality requirement. This area is particularly difficult for U.S. courts because of the almost unique
way in which the United States has bifurcated its criminal law
system. Whereas most nations have a single criminal code,
early concerns regarding the allocation of power in the United
States led to the development of different criminal codes in
each state as well as a body of federal criminal law." Because
dual criminality requires that the offense be criminal under the
laws of both the requesting and the requested States, the question arises whether this means federal law or state law, or
both. Part of the problem is that many bilateral extradition
treaties entered into by the United States contain language
mandating that the conduct must be considered criminal by
both contracting parties. Because individual states cannot contract with another nation, they are clearly not a contracting
party." Ostensibly then, state law should not apply. But bev. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827
F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988); United States a rel.
Rauch v. Stockinger, 269 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959), reh'g
denied, 361 U.S. 973 (1960). But see United States v. Deaton, 448 F. Supp. 532,
536 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (following the Factor analysis), afpd, 597 F.2d 769 (5th Cir.
1979).
43.
See, e.g., Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713, 719 (10th Cir. 1989); In re
Sindona, 584 F. Supp. 1437, 1447 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
See, e.g., Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 851 (1st Cir. 1980) ("Although we
44.
do not accept appellant's argument that strict congruity of offenses is necessary to
meet the test of double criminality, we agree that the offenses of the two countries
must be substantially analogous."); see also Oen Ym-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F.2d
1400, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting Wright's "substantially analogousn standard), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Russell v. United States, 789 F.2d 801,
803 (9th Cir. 1986).
45.
Federalism, however, is not the sole source of the diverse bodies of United
States criminal law. Other nations, such as Germany, also have one national government along with separate governments for each state, but have only one national criminal code.
46.
Sindona, 584 F. Supp. at 1447.
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cause so many common crimes under state law and the law of
foreign States have no U.S. federal counterpart, it would be
very difficult for the dual criminality requirement ever to be
met. United States courts have recognized this;'7 and althoughdivided on the question, most courts heed Factor's ghost and
follow the trend toward a permissive reading of the dual criminal requirement allowing federal or state law to apply."
As it loosened the general interpretation of the dual criminality requirement, the Wright-Collins-Factor line of cases also
liberalized the choice of law question. In Wright, the United
States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether conduct could be considered criminal under the laws of the asylum
state when there was no federal law prohibiting the conduct.
The Court determined that the language of the treaty should
be interpreted broadly to allow state as well as federal law to
be invoked in order to meet the requirement." Similarly, in
Collins the Supreme Court held that criminality in the requested State could be shown through state law.50The Factor decision;l in addition to expanding the ways in which the dual
47.
See, e.g., id. ("Although Article 11 of the Treaty b t w e e n the United States
and Italy] requiring that offenses be 'punishable by the laws of both Contracting
Parties' if read literally would preclude reference to the laws of New York since
New York is not a Contracting Party, it is well settled that treaties are to be construed liberally rather than literally.") (citing Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S.
276, 293 (1933)).
48.
One district court put it this way:
A majority view, which this court adopts, is that it is only necessary to
determine that the a d s on which the foreign charges are based are proscribed by similar criminal provisions of federal law, the law of the asylum state or the law of the preponderance of states. This broad interpretation comports with the basic principle of international law that treaties
should be construed to enlarge the rights of the parties.
In re Extradition of Rushinowski, 574 F. Supp. 1439, 1446 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (citing
Factor, 290 U.S. at 293-94, for the second proposition) (citations omitted).
49.
The Court gave the following rationale for its broad reading:
As the State of New York was the place where the accused was found
and in legal effed the asylum to which he had fled, is the language of
the treaty, "made criminal by the laws of both countries," to be interpreted as limiting its scope to a d s of Congress, and eliminating the operation
of the laws of the States? That view would largely defeat the object of
our extradition treaties by ignoring the f a d that for nearly all crimes and
misdemeanors the laws of the States, and not the enactments of Congress, must be looked to for the definition of the offence [sic].
Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58-59 (1903) (citation omitted).
50.
Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 314-15 (1922).
51.
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
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criminality requirement could be satisfied, also added a new
twist t o the choice of law questionh Factor, the Court considered whether conduct which was clearly not criminal under the
laws of the asylum state could nevertheless meet the dual
criminality requirement. The Court held that dual criminality
was satisfied because the two nations, Great Britain and the
United States, had inserted the charged offense into their extradition treaty as an extraditable crime.52 Because of this
reasoning, a showing by the fugitive that his conduct was not
criminal under the law of the asylum state was not enough to
escape extradition. Factor made clear that the laws of the asylum state were not controlling, clarifying some confusion which
had arisen after Wright and Collins.53According to the Factor
Court, an underlying rationale for the decision was the desire
to avoid construing a treaty in a way that would cause the
success of extradition requests by foreign nations to vary from
state to state.54Modern courts have generally complied with
Factor in this regard.
For example, the Second Circuit in Shapiro v.
~ e r r a n d i n alooked
~ ~ t o the language of the applicable treaty to
determine which law to apply in ascertaining the criminality of
the conduct. The defendant in Shcrpiro "demonstrate[d] convincingly" that his conduct was not criminal under the the laws of
the asylum state.56But rather than concluding that the dual
criminality requirement was not satisfied, the court stated that
"the Treaty refers not to the 'laws of the place where the person sought shall be found'. . . but to the laws of both parties.'
Since the United States rather than New York is a party to the
Treaty, the Treaty impels us t o look t o the laws of the federal
government. . . ."' The court then found that, based on federal law, the defendant was extraditable on some, but not all, of
the charges."
One modern court addressed a question left unanswered by

52.
Id. at 299-300.
53.
Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 848 (1st Cir. 1980) (%I [Factor], the Court
addressed the choice of law principle implicit in Wright and Collins that
extraditability could be established only on the basis of the asylum state's law.").
54.
Factor, 290 U.S. at 300.
55.
478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 US. 884 (1973).
56.
Id. at 910.
57.
Id. (citations omitted).
58.
Id. at 910-14.
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the earlier cases: whether conduct which is criminal under the
laws of the asylum state but not under the laws of the preponderance of states satisfies dual criminality. In Brauch v. Raiche," the First Circuit found that existing United States Supreme Court opinions were not dispositive of this question.60
The Brauch court determined that an expansive reading of the
dual criminality requirement was in order-following the liberal treaty interpretation validated by Factor? To that extent,
the court was consistent with Factor. However, the court went
considerably further, construing Factor as supporting a choice
of law rule which would grant extradition &om the asylum
state if the conduct was criminal under the laws of that state
but non-criminal in the majority of other states.62 This would
appear to be a t odds with Factor's express rationale that consistency among the states is more important than whether the
conduct is criminal under the law of the asylum state.
Nevertheless, the current state of the law appears to be
that if the offense is considered criminal under federal law, the
law of the asylum state, or under the law of the preponderance
of states, the dual criminality requirement is satisfied.s3 This
reflects modern balancing. Courts liberally grant extradition for
the sake of suppressing international crime, but because the
act must be criminal under one of these bodies of law, the
rights of the individual are also protected.

59.
618 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1980).
Id. at 850 ('We find neither the Supreme Court precedents nor the recent
60.
cases construing similar extradition treaties to be dispositive of the choice of law
question in this case.").
61.
Id. at 848.
Id. at 849 ( " m e do not believe [that Factor's] disapproval of extraditability
62.
varyjng with state law would extend to the situation in which one state's law
might confer extraditability, while that of the preponderance of the states would
not.").
63.
See, e.g, id. at 851; Theron v. United States Marshal, 832 F.2d 492, 496
(9th Cir. 1987) ("In assessing dual criminality, courts examine 'similar [criminal]
provisions of federal law or, if none, the law of the place where the fugitive is
found or, if none, the law of the preponderance of states."') (citations omitted), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988); Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252, 1262
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (Yn sum, we conclude that neither the laws of this state, nor the
United States, nor a healthy majority of the states in this country recognize the
commercial bribery contemplated by 8 383 of the Canadian Criminal Code, with
the result that such conduct is not criminal 'according to the laws of the place
where the . . . person so charged shall be found' within the meaning of Article X
of the instant treaty.").
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111. PROSECUTORIAL
PROBLEMS
PRESENTED
BY
THE DUAL CRIMINALITY
REQUIREMENT
Courts have offered differing rationales for weakening the
dual criminality requirement's potential to foil a desired extradition attempt." Even so, consistently underlying the dual
criminality decisions has been the sentiment that the requirement may be relaxed-thus preserving international interest in
extraditing an individual which both the requesting and requested States wish to extradite-while continuing to protect
individuals from unjust foreign prosecution. The worldwide
interest in liberal extradition policies has grown even stronger
in the last twenty years as savvy international drug traflickers
and terrorists seek to exploit the technicalities of the dual criminality requirement in order to avoid prosecution."
A. The Dual Criminality Requirement and
Complex Criminal Statutes
The problems created worldwide by drug traflicking are
staggering. Worldwide societal costs, including the cost of fighting the crime which accompanies the drug trade, exceed one
hundred billion dollars annually.66 In response, many governments, including the United States, have declared a "war on
drugs."' Because drug trafficking is international in scope,s8
international extradition of drug criminals has become very
important t o the war on drugs. Extradition requests are steadily increasing worldwide as a direct result of the battle against
the drug trade? Many countries view extradition of drug criminals--especially t o the United States-as essential, particularly "in those cases where the requested government is unable to
keep major drug traffickers incarcerated because of the intimi-

64.
See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
65.
See, e.g., Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y.1990), affd,
925 F.2d 615 (2d. Cir. 1991).
66.
J. Richard Barnett, Comment, Extradition Treaty Improvements to Combat
Drug Traficking, 15 GA. J. INT'L& COW. L. 285-90 (1985).
67.
See Andrea M. Grilli, Note, Preventing Billions from Being Washed Offshore:
A Growing Approach to Stopping International Drug Tmmking, 14 SYRACU~E J.
INTL
' L. & COM.65 (1987).
68.
Barnett, supra note 66, at 287.
69.
Barbara Sicalides, Comment, RICO, CCE, and Internutional Extradition, 62
TEMP.L. REV. 1281, 1283 n.20 (1989).
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dation, through force and corruption, of public ~ E c i a l s . "Ther~~
efore, denial of extradition based solely on dual criminality has
become increasingly unpopular.
However, United States laws often used as grounds for
extradition to the United States of international drug
criminals, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") and Continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE") Acts," are sometimes ruled invalid for purposes of international extradition because they fail the dual criminality req ~ i r e m e n t One
. ~ ~ commentator explained why RICO and CCE
offenses often fail the dual criminality requirement:
To sustain a conviction under RICO, the prosecution must
demonstrate that the defendant conducted a pattern of racketeering activity, which is defined as the commission of at least
two underlying predicate acts within ten years of each other.
Once a pattern of racketeering activity is established, the
prosecution must prove that the defendant engaged in any
one of four different [prohibited] activities: (1)investing income derived from a pattern of racketeering in an enterprise
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce; (2) acquiring rui
interest in such an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering; (3) operating such an enterprise through racketeering; or
(4) conspiring to do any of the preceding. This second level of
proof required under RICO may involve conduct that does not

70.
Id. at 1316.
These statutes are popular among prosecutors because of their harsh pen71.
alties: "A drug offender convided of CCE . . . faces a term . . . of twenty years to
life imprisonment without possibility of parole. For a single RICO violation, imprisonment may be for up to twenty years." Steven A. Bernholz et al., Problems of
Double CriminaliCy: Intenational Extradition in CCE and RICO Cases, RUAL, Jan.
1985, at 58, 60.
Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1283; see also Steven A. Bernholz et al., Inter72.
national Extradition in Drug Cases, 10 N.C. J . INT'L L. & COM. REG. 353, 358
(1985) ("Because CCE and RICO are solely creatures of United States law, a
defendant whose extradition is sought by the United States on such charges may
argue successfully that the foreign country cannot extradite him, because these
crimes do not constitute extraditable offenses under the treaty [and hence fail to
meet the dual criminality requirement].") Sandi R. Murphy, Comment, Drug
Diplomacy and the Supply-side Strategy: A Survey of United States Practice, 43
VAND.L. REV. 1259, 1290-91 (1990) ("In drug cases, the United States is often not
able to request extradition for a specific crime, such as continuing criminal enterprise crimes, because the offense has no counterpart in the law of the foreign
country.").
Note also that whereas dual criminality problems such as choice of law are
unique to United States courts, the dual criminality problems presented by CCE
and RICO are unique to foreign courts.
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constitute criminal offenses in the requested state. Consequently . . . the double criminality principle . . . would bar the
surrender of any RICO offenders requested by the United
States.
The result is the same if the requested state rigidly applies the double criminality requirement to violations under
CCE . . . . In order to successfully convict under CCE, the
prosecution must also establish that the defendant occupies a
management position in a group of a t least five other individuals from which the defendant obtains substantial income or
resources. Although the predicates underlying the CCE statute are, like RICO, commonly recognized offenses, the second
level of proof required in a CCE prosecution-that the defendant occupy a supervisory po sition-arguably precludes extradition under a strict application of [the dual] criminality [requirement] because most other nations do not specifically
make occupying a management position in a drug operation
substantive rimes.'^

Despite the fact that CCE and RICO seem to present substantial barriers to extradition because they fail to meet the dual
criminality requirement, international pressure to combat the
drug crisis has led some foreign courts to hold that CCE and
RICO claims are extraditable. Clearly such a finding can only
be supported by the broadest interpretation of the dual criminality requirement."
For example, in Sudar v. u.SA.," a Canadian court granted the extradition of an individual wanted in the United States
on RICO charges. The defendant in Sudur argued that extradition would violate the principle of dual criminality. The Ontario
Supreme Court, however, held that the dual criminality requirement was met because the RICO charges involved murder,
arson, conspiracy, and extortion, and such crimes were also
Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1310-11 (citations omitted); see also Bernholz et
73.
al., supra note 71, at 60 ("Because CCE and RICO are unique to U.S. law, defendants whose extradition is sought by the United States on CCE and RICO charges
may successfully argue that the foreign country cannot extradite them because
their crimes do not constitute extraditable offenses under the applicable treaty.?;
Kester, s u p m note 21, at 1462 (The requirement of dual criminality should stand
as an important bar to extradition in many cases involving federal rather than
state crimes, for most federal offenses are structured much differently from common law antecedents. The barrier it creates is most apparent when the United
States is the party seeking extradition of a person from abroad.").
74.
Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1310.
75.
25 S.C.R. 3d 183 (Can. 1981).

'
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criminal in Canada.
Similarly, the Australian High Court, when presented with
a U.S. request to extradite a person facing CCE charges, determined that such an offense was extraditable despite the fact
that no similar charge existed under Australian law. The court
addressed possible dual criminality problems by using the following reasoning:
As a generally accepted limitation of obligations under extradition treaties, [double criminality] avoids the international
complications and ill-will which are likely to result from an
ad hoc refbsal of extradition based on the unacceptability to
the requested state of particular laws of a requesting state.
The utility of the principle of double criminality is, however,
likely to be outweighed by the impediment which it represents to the advancement of criminal justice if its content is
defined in over-technical terms which would preclude extradition by reason of technical differences between legal systems
notwithstanding that the acts alleged against the accused
involve serious criminality under the law of both the requesting and requested state^.'^

Such logic comports with reasoning used by United States
courts during this century as they determined that an expansive reading of the dual criminality requirement was justified
for reasons mentioned above.77Nevertheless, some international scholars fear that individual rights are being recklessly endangered and have criticized decisions such as Sudar and Riley
as unduly broad interpretations of the dual criminality requirement.78
Despite such sentiment, courts in the United States seem
willing to accept the liberal approach to dual criminality taken
by foreign courts. This is especially true when drug offenses are
involved. For example, in United States v. ~evy," the Tenth
Circuit heard the appeal of a man extradited to the United
States from Hong Kong on CCE charges, for which he was later
76.
Riley v. Commonwealth, 60 A.L.J.R. 106, 111 (Austl. 1985), quoted by
Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1314.
77. The Australian High Court's language bears resemblance to language from Factor v. Laubenheirner, 290 U.S. 276 (1933). See supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
78.
supra note 11, at 354; Bernholz et al., supra note 72,
See, e.g., BASSIOUNI,
at 361-64.
79.
905 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct 759 (1991).
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convicted. The appellant claimed that "CCE is not an extraditable offense because of the lack of a crime in Hong Kong having analogous elements."80The court responded that such an
argument "misstates the nature of the dual criminality requirement." The court held instead that, "[tlhe focus of dual criminality is not on how the crime is defined in the particular statutes the defendant is accused of violating; it is on the criminality of the defendant's alleged conduct."81 Therefore, the court
determined that because the basis of the CCE charge was the
defendant's participation in a cocaine trafficking operation and
such conduct was proscribed by the laws of both the requesting
and requested State, the dual criminality requirement had
been ~atisfied?~
However, some nations have not adopted the United States' liberal view of the dual criminality requirement and, consequently, routinely deny extradition requests from the United
States based on CCE and RICO charges.83 Usually nations

80. Id. at 328.
81. Id.
82. Id. Other recent decisions also show United States courts' willingness to
stretch the dual criminality requirement in whatever manner is necessary in order
to convict drug traffickers. In Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y.
1990), a#'d 925 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1991), a U.S. district court granted a request by
the Italian government to extradite a fugitive wanted for conspiracy to engage in
the trafficking of narcotics. Bassiouni himself appeared at the trial on behalf of the
defendant. Even so, the court-quoting Bassiouni-held that the extradition request
was justified. Although a crime with similar elements was not to be found in
United States state or federal law, the court nevertheless found that the dual
criminality requirement had been satisfied because the conduct was criminal in
both jurisdictions. Id. at 372-73.
Interestingly, the court in Spatda devoted a substantial portion of its opinion
to justifying its decision on the grounds that the executive branch of government
supported the extradition request. For example, the court gave great deference to
the political considerations behind extradition of drug criminals, stating that
"undue interference with the diplomatic process of extradition by the judicial
branch is as unseemly and disruptive of separation of powers and of the foreign
relations of the nation as any judicial foray into this very political realm." Id. at
370. Therefore, the court relegated its role to simply determining "whether the
executive branch is authorized by statute and treaty to honor a particular extradition request." Id.
83.
Bernholz et al., supra note 72, at 357-58; see also Sicalides, supra note 69,
at 1283 (To prosecute drug producers who conduct their illicit activities outside
the United States, prosecutors must extradite them from the nations in which they
have asylum. The effectiveness of RICO and CCE [in combatting the international
drug problem], however, have [sic] been severely limited by the refusal of some
nations to extradite individuals who import narcotics into the United
states . . . .").
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deny such extradition requests due to respect for past decisions
. ~ ~ examwhich utilized a strict reading of dual ~ r i m i n a l i t yFor
ple, last year the Swiss Justice Department received a request
from the United States to extradite the now famous international financier Adnan Khashoggi. Although the Swiss Justice
Department agreed to turn over Khashoggi to face fraud charges, it refused to extradite him on RICO charges. The rationale
for the decision was that "[elxtradition [on the RICO charges]
is not possible because of the lack of mutual ~riminality."~~
Such nations may be missing the point of the dual criminality requirement. The dual criminality requirement is now
based largely on principles of international comity and cooperation in combatting crimes. For example, since fighting the drug
trade is an international goal, dual criminality barring extradition of drug criminals would stand the requirement on its head.
The following comment's reasoning is compelling:
In essence, double criminality is a reciprocity requirement that is intended to ensure states that they can depend
on corresponding treatment, and that no state will be forced
to use its processes to surrender an individual, possibly one of
its own nationals, to be prosecuted and punished for conduct
that the requested state does not deem deserving of punishment. Reciprocity is required throughout extradition agreements because of political considerations and the sovereignty
doctrine. Even though no other nation has enacted statutes
with . . . structures similar to RICO and CCE, most nations
condemn the activities that these two statutes target and all
have their own 1egislati;on aimed at the same final
result-elimination of narcotics trafficking. International
conventions such as the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
evidence the international community's resolve to stem narcotics trafficking. Reciprocity and sovereignty do not require
that conduct universally considered abhorrent go unpunished
because of the use of unusual elements designed to reach the
worst offenders . . . .

....

Because international cooperation is essential in the battle
against narcotics traffickers, and most nations consider drug
84. Another reason some nations retain the stricter view of dual criminality is
fear of terrorist reprisals by drug traffickers who fear extradition to the United
States. See infra note 130.
85.
Swiss Extradite Khashoggi to Face U.S. Fraud Charges, REXJTERSNEWS REPOWS, July 19, 1989, AM Cycle.
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trafficking illegal, there is no need for rigid application of the
double criminality requirement in this context.86

Some would disagree, claiming that international doctrines
such as dual criminality should be strictly interpreted, thereby
always barring extradition based on RICO or CCE charges?
However, the integrity of dual criminality can arguably be
preserved in cases where the requested State does not wish to
extradite. Should this occur, the requested State could simply
refuse the request based on exceptions t o the duty to extradite
established by international law." This would increase the
effectiveness of CCE and RICO in combatting the international
drug problem.'' Nevertheless, disagreement remains over how
far to extend the dual criminality principle when a fugitive
faces RICO or CCE charges.
B. The "Special Use"Jurisdictional
Problem of the Dual Criminality Requirement
Another area in which the dual criminality requirement
Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1313-14 (citations omitted). Bedi also supports
86.
this position:
The law of extradition is an instrvment of international co-operation for
the suppression of crime, in which all nations have a common interest,
because crime constitutes a menace to any human society and weakens
the very foundations of social life. If by simply placing himself outside the
territory of the state in which he has committed a crime, a criminal places himself beyond the reach of the law which he has violated and if so
without any risk he manages to escape penalty attached to his guilt by
simply fleeing to a foreign country, there will be a complete failure of justice.
BEDI,supra note 1, at 47-48, quoted in Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1315.
87. See, e.g., Bernholz et al., supra note 71, at 61-63:
[Wlhen all the elements [of CCE] are taken together, it is plain that
the offense is an exclusive genus of US. criminal law. As the crime is
not recognized as punishable in foreign countries, it cannot satisfy the
principle of double criminality and hence cannot be an extraditable offense.

....

Because RICO is unknown to foreign law, if the United States seeks the
extradition of an alleged drug offender for a RICO offense, the requested
country should not grant the warrant.

Id.
88.
Such exceptions could include the political offense exception, or language
included in many treaties which states that the dual criminality requirement is to
be liberally interpreted. BASSIOUNI,
supra note 11, at 10-12.
89.
Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1316.
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has caused problems is its use in cases of extraterritorial
crimes. Most problematic are terrorist a d s against nationals of
one country who are in another country,gOand participation in
international drug trafficking conspira~ies.~~
Following such
conduct, requested States may justifiably refuse an extradition
request on the ground that the requesting State has no jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes.Q2This occurs when the
jurisdictional theory used by the requesting State is not recognized by the requested State. In this situation, the offense is
not considered extraditable under the laws of the requesting
State. Therefore the dual criminality principle bars extradition.
This is known as the "special use" of the dual criminality req~irement.'~
Because this "special use" of the dual criminality requirement
presents another obstacle to the modern balance between individual rights and the international interest in suppressing
crime, courts have sought to relax this aspect of dual criminality as well. However, as yet no principled method has been
found to overcome this obstacle due to the variety of often mutually exclusive jurisdictional theories utilized by different nations. An examination of some of these theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction and their potential inapplicability in the areas
of international drug trafficking conspiracies or acts of international terrorism follows.

1. The five traditional bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction
There are five traditional bases of jurisdiction potentially
covering extraterritorial acts: territorial, protective, nationality," passive personality, and universality." While all of
90. See infia notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
91. Seeid.
92. Seeid.
93. Christopher L. Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and
Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crimes, 1984 UTAHL. REV 685, 744-45. Professor
Blakesley made the following comment about this "special use" of the dual criminality requirement:
A specialized notion of double criminality that generally works to deny
extradition, even when the offense on which the extradition request is
based constitutes a crime in each state and is listed in the treaty as
extraditable, will be labelled the "special use" of double criminality. Extradition will be denied when the theory of jurisdiction maintained by the
requesting state is not accepted by the requested state.
Id.
94
This theory is also known as active personality. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI,supra
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these jurisdictional bases have the potential to cover extraterritorial crimes, an analysis of each shows that extraterritorial
jurisdiction asserted under any one of these bases may fail.
a. The territorial basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The
territorial basis of jurisdiction allows a country to enact domestic laws which prohibit certain conduct committed within its
territory.g6A strict interpretation of territorial jurisdiction requires that the entire proscribed act be committed within the
territory of the requested State.g7Some nations have adopted
more liberal interpretations of the territorial principle of jurisdiction, such as subjective and objective territoriality. Subjective territoriality provides that if one of the elements of the
crime is committed within the territory of the requesting nation, that nation has jurisdiction to prosecute.g8Objective territoriality is even more liberal, allowing for the prosecution of
an individual engaged in conduct proscribed by the requesting
State even when the a d occurred wholely outside of the
State." The only requirement here is that the act produce
harmful effects within the requesting State.'''
Most nations have adopted the more liberal objective view of
the territorial basis for jurisdiction. Consequently, "[als long as
the offense itself, its result or effect, or any of the constituent

note 11, at 253.
95.
Blakesley, supra note 93, at 687.
ET AL., supra note 7, at 85-90.
SWEENEY,
96.
See Blakesley, supra note 93, at 689.
97.
See id. at 691.
98.
For a general discussion of the objective territorial theory of jurisdiction,
99.
see BASSIOUNI,
supra note 11, at 261-68.
ET AL., supra note 7, at 90-108. The authors also cite the Restate100. SWEENEY
ment on the Law of Foreign Relations 18 (1965) as an express acceptance of this
liberal view of territorial jurisdiction:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an
effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the
territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal
systems.
Id. at 107-08.
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or material elements actually occur within the sovereign territory of the requesting party, assertion of jurisdiction will be
seen as proper in either state and extradition will be approved . . . ."lo'
b. The protective basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Protective extraterritorial jurisdiction exists when an extraterritorial offense "has or potentially has an adverse effect on or poses
a danger to a state's security, integrity, sovereignty, o r governmental ti on."'^^ Although this definition of protective jurisdiction sounds similar to the objective territoriality theory,los
there is a distinction between the two." Under the objective
territoriality theory, jurisdiction exists if the extraterritorial act
has any harmful effect within the State. The protective theory
of jurisdiction, by contrast, allows for the exercise of jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts even when those acts do not result in an effect within the requesting State, but merely constitute a threat to the requesting State's national security or
other vital interest.lo5In other words, whereas objective territorial jurisdiction requires at least some effect within the State,
protective jurisdiction requires only apotential effect within the
State. The breadth of this jurisdictional theory has made it
attractive to nations searching for ways to convict participants
in foiled international drug trafficking conspiracies which intend to have a harmful effect on a nation, but in fact do not
because they are ~nsuccessful.'~~
c. The nationality basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The
nationality theory of jurisdiction provides that citizens are entitled to the protection of their nation "even when they are out101. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 701.
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
104. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 701.
105. Id. at 702. Professor Blakesley made the following comment regarding the
principle of protective jurisdiction:
The protective principle is designed to allow a state to protect itself
against and to punish the perpetrators of actual and inchoate offenses
that damage or threaten to damage state security, sovereignty, treasury
or governmental functions. It is the only accepted theory that allows jurisdiction over conduct that threatens potential danger to the
above-mentioned interests or functions and, because of the signit"1cant
dangers it poses to relations among nations, it is limited to those recognized and stated interests or functions.
Id. at 705.
106. See Bernholz et al., supra note 72, at 370-71.

.
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side its territorial bo~ndaries."'~'The rationale for this jurisdictional theory is that
[flrom the perspective of international law, nationals of a
state remain under that state's personal sovereignty and owe
their allegiance to it, even though travelling or residing outside its territory. The state has legal authority under international and domestic law, based on that allegiance, to assert
criminal jurisdiction over actions of one of its nationals
deemed criminal by that state's laws.108

Accordingly, in cases of extradition, if both the requesting and
the requested States recognize this theory of jurisdiction, then
terrorists and international drug traffickers can be convicted by
their nation of origin when they commit such activities abroad.
d. The passive personality basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Under the nationality theory, nationals residing or
travelling outside of their State are nevertheless subject to its
jurisdiction when they commit certain crimes. The passive
personality theory, conversely, provides that a nation has jurisdiction over those who commit crimes against its citizens while
they are abroad. The reasoning behind this theory is that
"[slince the ultimate welfare of the state itself depends upon
the welfare of its nationals, it can be asserted that a state has
a legitimate interest in the prosecution of those who have been
found guilty of committing crimes against its nationals while
abroad."logThis jurisdictional theory is especially popular in
Europe. For example, France enacted a law in 1975 recognizing
its right to prosecute individuals engaged in activities which
harm French nationals abroad.ll0 Blakesley notes that, "[clompared to the other nations of Europe, h c e was actually
late in developing the passive personality principle to this extent.""' However, other nations, including the United States,
reject this theory.ln
e. The universality basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction.

107.
BASSIOUNI,
supra note 11, at 288.
108. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 706 (citations omitted).
109. BASSIOUNI,
supra note 11, at 291.
110.
Blakesley, supra note 93, at 713-14. Clearly the motivation behind the
enactment of this law was the 1974 Hague incident, in which French nationals
were taken hostage. Id.
111. Id. at 715 n.94.
112. Id. at 715.
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This basis of jurisdiction is reserved for acts considered universally reprehensible. Under this jurisdictional theory, all States
may participate in the prosecution of individuals engaged in
such activities because of a common interest in punishing such
cond~ct."~Professor Bassiouni gave the following rationale
for this jurisdictional basis:
Some offenses, due to their very nature, affect the interests of all states, even when committed in a given state or
against a given state, victim, or interest. Such offenses may
even be committed in an area not subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of any state, such as the high seas, air space or
outer space. The gravaman of such an offense is that it constitutes a violation against mankind. . . . Any state, if it captures the offender, may prosecute and punish that person on
behalf of the world community.114

This jurisdictional theory has often been applied to acts such as
piracy, genocide, and various war crimes.'15

2. "Special use" of dual criminality as a bar to extradition
Having authority to proscribe extraterritorial conduct is
only the first step in prosecuting such conduct. An additional
prosecutorial prerequisite is a showing that the nation seeking
to enforce its laws has jurisdiction to do so. In the extradition
context, the requesting State must present a mutually acceptable jurisdictional theory before the dual criminality requirement can be satisfied.'''
Because "jurisdictional issues are determined by the requested State,""' problems often arise when the basis of the
requesting State's extraterritorial jurisdiction is not recognized
by the requested State? When this is the case, the "special

113. See SWEENEYEl' AL., supra note 7, at 118.
114. BASSIOUNI,
supra note 11, at 298.
115. SWEENEY El' AL., supra note 7, at 118.
116. Id. at 84-85. This jurisdictional aspect of the dual criminality requirement
is known as its 'special use." Therefore, satisfaction of dual criminality requires
not only that the a d be considered criminal by both the requesting and requested
States, but that each State recognize the jurisdictional theory invoked by the
requested State in its attempt to prosecute the fugitive.
117. BASSIOUNI,
supra note 2, at 313.
118. Another problem arising in this area is that of concurrent jurisdiction.
When both the State requesting extradition and the State receiving the request
claim to have jurisdiction over an individual, principles of sovereignty may compel

220 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW El992

use" of the dual criminality requirement may bar extradition
even when any or all of the traditional bases of extraterritorial
jurisdiction are invoked by the requesting nation. One area in
which this has consistently been a problem is drug conspiracies. Although this offense comes close to fitting several of the
traditional jurisdictional categories, and may fit them in certain circumstances, the traditional bases of extraterritorial
jurisdiction often fail to provide prosecutorid pos~ibilities."~
Similarly, acts of international terrorism may go unprosecuted
because the requesting and requested States cannot agree on a
mutually acceptable jurisdictional theory.120
a. "Special use"problems under the territorial basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. This approach is probably the most
likely to survive the "special use" of the dual criminality requirement because nearly all nations recognize this principle of
jurisdi~tion.'~'However, a strict application of this principle
would often preclude extradition for extraterritorial crimes because such an interpretation requires that the act be committed wholly inside the boundaries of the nation requesting extradition. In cases of international activites such as terrorism
and drug traffcking, this is rarely the case. Therefore, an expansive interpretation of the requirement, such as the objective
territoriality theory, is necessary. But because not all nations
have accepted such a broad interpretation, extradition may be
denied in instances where the requested State does not recognize the objective territoriality theory.
Even extradition requests involving nations which have
accepted the objective territoriality theory may fail because the
"effect" on the requesting State required by this theory is so
tenuous that it will not be recognized by the requested

the requested State to deny the extradition request. See CLYDEEAGLETON,
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT87 (3d ed. 1957). A detailed discussion of this problem is
outside the scope of this paper.
119. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 719-20.
120. See infrcr notes 121-26 and accompanying text; see also Christopher L.
Blakesley, Jurisdiction as Legal Protection Against Terrorism; 19 CONN.L. REV.
895 (1987). The political offense exception also may present a barrier to extradition
in cases of international terrorism. In addition to his works on extraterritorial
jurisdiction, Professor Blakesley has also discussed extradition and acts of international terrorism in Christopher L. Blakesley, The Evisceration of the Political
offense Exception to Extradition, 15 DEN.J . INT'LL. & PoL'Y 109 (1986).
121. BASSIOUNI,supra note 11, at 254.
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State.'= This is often the case with drug conspiracies, or conspiracies to commit terrorist acts, especially when these conspiracies fail. This would include situations in which perpetrators are still in the planning stages, or when they are caught
during an attempt to engage in such activities, but prior to
doing any actual damage to the requested State? When this
occurs, even though the intent to commit an act designed to
have an "effect" on the requested State is clear, intent alone is
usually not enough to fit squarely under the objective
territoriality the01y.l~~In such circumstances, dual criminality's "special use" may bar extradition.
b. "Special useDproblemsunder the protective basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Many nations refuse to extradite individuals when the requesting State asserts the protective theory
of jurisdiction. A principle reason for the reluctance t o accept
this theory is its intrusiveness. As Professor Bassiouni noted:
There is . . . no general rule of international law which
prohibits the application of this theory either on a restricted
or an unlimited basis. The potential for using this theory in
extradition is very vast. Indeed, if the authoritative decision-making process of a given participant is without restriction as
to what constitutes conduct performed outside its boundaries
but having an internal effect on its interest, which it deems
itself competent to protect, then almost every act by any person which affects the political and economic interest of a state
could subject such person to the jurisdiction of that state.125

Because nations do not wish to subject their own nationals
to such intrusive jurisdiction, they often will refuse extradition
requests based on this theory. The United States is one such
nation.126 In addition, because the protective principle is
"traditionally limited t o offenses that pose a threat to national
security, sovereignty or some important governmental function,"12' some argue that drug conspiracies, and even terrorism, do not constitute such a threat.'"

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Blakesley, supra note 93, at 701.
Id. at 755.
Bernholz et al., supra note 72, at 370-71; Blakesley, supra note 93, at 719.
supra note 11, at 297.
BASSIOUNI,
See id.
Blakesley, supra note 93, at 720.
See id.
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c. "Special useBproblemsunder the nationality basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The nationality basis of jurisdiction may
also present "special use" dual criminality problems. Bassiouni
noted that although this principle of jurisdiction is "universally
accepted," because "its precise definition and application differs
widely,"'" the requesting and requested States may not
agree on the interpretation of nationality jurisdiction posed by
the requested State. Therefore, under the "special use* of the
dual criminality requirement, the requested State may be
forced to deny the extradition request because the two nations'
conceptions of nationality jurisdiction differ. Given Professor
Bassiouni's statement, this is not unlikely.
In addition, because the act is committed in a foreign jurisdiction, the issue consistently arises as to who should prosecute--the nation of the offender's citizenship, or the nation
which apprehended the offender. If the a d is criminal in the
requested State, that State has the right, under the principle of
territorial jurisdiction, to prosecute the person committing a
criminal act within its borders. Because some criminals, especially drug trfickers, often have control over governmental
processes in certain nations, there is a high probability that
such criminals may ''convince" the requested State to proceed
itself rather than grant extradition.lsO
supra note 11, at 288.
129. BASSIOUNI,
130. See Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1316. Professor Sicalides commented on the
necessity of extradition in such situations:
Extradition is essential, especially in those cases where the requested
government is unable to keep major drug traffickers incarcerated because
of the intimidation, through force and corruption, of public officials. "It is
the threat of extradition . . . that has drawn the ire of Columbia's drug
mafia. 'Extradition is the thing they fear the most . . . . Everything else
is just the cost of doing business."' Extradition is the primary fear of
these major drug traffickers because it is frequently all that stands between themselves and prosecution.
Id. (citation omitted). Another example of this fear is the recent surrender of many
of Columbia's top drug cartel members following an offer from the Columbian government to try them in that country rather than extradite them to the United
States. TIME recently reported the following:
SURRENDERED. Jorge Luis Ochoa Vaqpez, 41, No. 2 man of the violent
Medellin cocaine cartel who is wanted on drug trafficking charges in the
U.S.;to Colombian authorities; in Caldas, Colombia. The fXth cartel member to turn himself in in recent months, Ochoa took advantage of a Colombian government promise that traffickers who give up will not be
extradited to the U.S. Ochoa's move could trigger more surrenders, but
U.S. officials are concerned that Colombia may treat those who come
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d. "Special use" problems under the passive personality
basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Because the passive personality theory is not accepted in many juri~dictions,''~"special use" of dual criminality will ofken bar extradition. Several
cases illustrate the failure of the passive personality principle
of jurisdiction to provide for extradition of an individual committing an offense against a national of the requesting State.
In the Abu Daoud case,ls2 Israel requested the extradition of
Daoud on charges involving the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre. France was forced to deny the request because it did not
adhere to the passive personality basis of jurisdiction at the
time that the massacre occurred. Therefore, the court reasoned
that the dual criminality requirement could not be satisfied, and Daoud was released.
The United States has also denied extradition requests for
similar reasons. In 1940, Mexican officials requested the extradition of an American citizen "for crimes committed against a
Mexican national outside Mexican territory."lsg The asserted
basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction was the passive personality
principle. The United States denied the request. The State
Department expressly based its decision on the special use of
the dual criminality requirement, stating that although Mexico
had adopted the passive personality principle, the United
States had not, and therefore extradition was impermissible.lM
e. "Special use" problems under the universality basis of
forward too leniently,
Surrendered, TIME, Jan. 28, 1991, at 87.
131. Chief among these is the United States:
The passive personality theory of jurisdiction is generally considered
anathematic to United States law. The Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law contains the traditional repudiation of the principle: "A
State does not have the jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law, attaching a
legal consequence to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on
the ground that the conduct affects one of its nationals . . . ." [Tlhe United States government has vehemently protested any assertion of jurisdiction by foreign courts over acts of United States nationals committed
against nationals of the forum state outside that state's territory.
Blakesley, supra note 93, at 715.
132. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 746-56 (citing 1977 Clunet 843 (Cours d'
Appel)); see also Mare Poirier, Note, International Terrorism: Extradition, 18 HAW.
INT~,LJ. 467 (1977) (commenting on the Abu Dmud case).
133. Blakesley, supm note 93, at 747.
134. See WHITEMAN,supra note 17, at 104.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction. The biggest barrier to recognition
of this jurisdictional theory is the categorization of an act as
universally reprehensible. Dual criminality problems arise in
this context because some nations categorize certain acts as
universally reprehensible while others do not. For example,
crimes traditionally fitting within the universality theory have
been piracy, slavery, and genocide.'" However, "[tlhere is a
growing trend to include terrorism and traffic in narcotic
drugs" as universal crimes.lsB If this trend continues,
countries could then proceed to extradite individuals on these
charges without fear of the dual criminality requirement barring the extradition request. Even so, terrorism and drug
trafficking have not yet achieved this status.'" Consequently,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to assert that this basis
of jurisdiction warranted extradition for these crimes.
IV. SUGGESTEDRESOLUTIONS
Although the dual criminality requirement has been loosely interpreted by most courts, and extradition rarely fails because of it, when dual criminality does block otherwise legitimate extradition requests it undermines the very policies behind permitting extradition. In order to serve the purposes for
which it exists,'" while not preventing extradition when it
would be appropriate, certain changes should be implemented.
Possible changes are the adoption of the proposals of the Tenth
International Congress of Penal Law ("Tenth International
Congress"), and/or the rewording of the dual criminality provisions t o reflect the model presented in a recent amendment of a
U.S.-West Germany Treaty. A solution to the "special use" of
the dual criminality requirement would be t o amend extradition treaties t o reflect language found in the U.S.Japan extradition treaty, and/or to adopt an alternate interpretation of
the objective territoriality theory of jurisdiction.

135. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
136. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 718.
137. Id. at 718-19 (commenting that terrorism and drug trafficking do not warrant categorization as universal crimes); SWEENEY
AL., supra note 7, at 118
("Despite the increase in the number of acts of terrorism in recent years, it is still
a matter of controversy whether it is a crime of universal interest.").
138. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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the objective territoriality theory of jurisdiction.

A. Proposals to Allow Extradition to
the United States for CCE and RICO Charges
I . Adopt proposals of the Tenth International Congress
The Tenth International Congress, which met in 1969,
adopted a resolution which mandates that the requested State
set aside the dual criminality requirement unless special circumstances exist.lsg Such special circumstances would involve
political turmoil in the requesting State or evidence that the
extradition request is simply subterfuge to return a person for
political, rather than penological purposes.140In such a situation, the requested State would be under no obligation to extradite the fugitive because of the political offense ex~eption.'~'
In addition, a court could use the loose in concreto method of
applying the dual criminality requirement, and find a way to
avoid extradition. 142
Such an approach would permit the United States to pursue drug traffickers and the like using RICO and CCE charges.
However, because countries refusing to comply with such a
resolution would still be able to deny extradition requests under more strict applications of the dual criminality requirement, this solution is potentially incomplete.
2. Amend extradition treaties to reflect the extradition treaty
between the United States and West Germany

A more effective, but perhaps less efficient route to change
would be to rework existing extradition treaties to reflect the
language of a recent amendment to a U.S.-West
Germany
extradition treaty. The now amended 1978 version of the dual
criminality portion of the extradition treaty defines extraditable offenses as follows:
(1) Extraditable offenses under this treaty are:
C

supra
139. 41 Revue Intenationale de droit penal 12 (1970), cited in BASSIOUNI,
note 2, at 322.
140. Id.
141. ~ E N E E
Yl?AL., supra note 7, at 142.
142. Id.; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text. This approach has the
support of Professor Bassiouni. BASSIOUNI,
supra note 2, at 322.
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(a) Offenses described in the Appendix to this Treaty which
are punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties;
(b)Offenses, whether listed in the Appendix to this Treaty or
not, provided they are punishable under the Federal laws of
the United States and the laws of the Federal Republic of
Germany.
In this connection it shall not matter whether or not the laws
of the Contracting Parties place the offense within the same
category of offenses or denominate an offense by the same
terminology.

This version ensures that courts will interpret the dual criminality provision in a liberal manner. However, this version falls
short of the revised version, which reads:
(1)Extraditable offenses under the Treaty are offenses which
are punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties. In
determining what is an extraditable offense it shall not matter whether or not the laws of the Contracting Parties place
the offense within the same category of offense or denominate
an offense by the same terminology, or whether dual criminality follows from Federal, State or Laender [German state]
laws. In particular, dual criminality may include offenses
based upon participation in an association whose aims and
activities include the commission of extraditable offenses,
such as a criminal society under the laws of the the Federal
Republic of Germany or an association involved in racketeering or criminal enterprise under the laws of the United
States. 144

Clearly the improved language of the Treaty is intended to
resolve some of the problems created by complex criminal statutes such as RICO and CCE. The new language facilitates
extradition in cases where both the requesting and the requested States wish to extradite but would have been unable to under the prior language. The modification also includes language
which eliminates any confusion over choice of law issues."
143. Treaty between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of
Germany Concerning Extradition, June 20, 1978, U.S.-F.R.G., 32 U.S.T. 1485,
1489, quoted in BASSIOUNI,supra note 11, at 334.
144. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, Oct. 21, 1986, US-F.R.G., S. Treaty
Doc. No. 100-6, 100 Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), quoted in BASSIOUM,supra note 11, at
335.
145. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text. Note that the language in
the treaty makes it clear that whether the law making the conduct criminal stems
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Although clearly time-consuming, the addition of similar language to all bilateral extradition treaties to which the United
States is a party would effectively resolve nearly all of the
problems currently associated with the dual criminality requirement.
Another alternative, directly targeted a t international drug
crimes, would be a multilateral treaty which would contain
CCE, RICO, and terrorism charges as extraditable offenses. By
making such actions internationally criminal, the problem of
dual criminality would be overcome. This is the approach advocated by United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de
Cuellar a t the forty-fourth General Assembly S e ~ s i o n . ' ~ ~
B. Proposals to Cure the Defects of
the "Special Use" of Dual Criminality
The "special use of double criminality . . . often does contradict general principles of jurisdiction and will cause denial of
extradition when perhaps it ought to su~ceed."'~' Therefore,
some changes are in order. There have been several suggested
resolutions to the "special use" of the dual criminality requirement, especially in cases involving terrorism and international
drug trade. For example, in an attempt to cure jurisdictional
problems with the extradition and prosecution of terrorists acts
committed against United States nationals abroad, Congress
passed a law in 1986 which provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorists acts committed abroad against United
States nati0na1s.l~~
from a federal or a state source, as long as the a d is criminal, the dual criminality requirement is satisfied.
146. To Crush Crime, Humanize Justice; Preview of the Eighth United Nations
Crime Congress, 27 UN. CHRONICLE,
June 1990, at 41.
147. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 751.
148. 18 U.S.C. 2331 (1986); see also, SWEENEY AL., supra note 7 , at 123-25
(providing text of the law, as well as commentary); Brandon S. Chabner, The
Omnibus Diplomatic Security a d Antiterrorism Act of 1986: Prescribing and
Enforcing United States Law Against Terrorist Violence Overseas, 37 UCLA L. REV.
985 (1990) (discussing potential jurisdictional problems with the new law). The
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime, Willliam J. Hughes (D-NJ),
pointed out at a later session that the bill was drafted in a manner intended to
avoid conflids with the dual rriminality principle:
[Wle found that, in drafting the law, particular attention had to be paid
to another body of law-that relating to international extradition. They go
hand in hand. Since these offenses are, by definition, committed outside
our country, we frequently will need to seek the cooperation of another
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Two problems are presented by the United States' solution
to the special use of the dual criminality requirement. First,
the law provides for capital punishment upon conviction. Several nations, including Germany, refuse to extradite individuals
who face a possible death sentence because such a penalty is
not allowed under their laws.14' Second, some nations will
not recognize the exercise of jurisdiction based upon the nationality of the victim. Therefore, the fact that the United States
thinks it has jurisdiction over a particular matter may not convince the requested State of United States compliance with the
special use of the dual criminality requirement. Because of
these problems, exploration of alternative solutions is warranted.
1. Adopt language of the United StatesJapan Extradition
Treaty
The language of t h e recently adopted United
S t a t e s J a p a n extradition treaty provides a model for circumventing "special use" problems. The applicable language provides:
When the offense for which extradition is requested has been
committed outside the territory of the requesting Party, the
requested Party shall grant extradition if the laws of that
Party provide for the punishment of such an offense committed outside its territory, or if the offense has been committed
by a national of the requesting Party.lbo

government in extraditing those who murder or assault U.S. nationals.
With this in mind, we found it necessary to modify the language of
the law so the requirement of dual criminality is met. Dual criminality
means that both our country and the country from which we are seeking
extradition have comparable laws covering the conduct in question. A law
written in special language describing international terrorism might not
match up with a similar law in Germany or Japan. We solved this problem by making the statute essentially a murder statute which is then
linked to terrorist-type circumstances by a certification of the Attorney
General.
Federal News Service, Hearings of the Crime Subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee on Terrorist Acts Abroad Way 31, 1989).
149. Id. ("Most countries do not have capital punishment, and several have
constitutions, statutes, or policies prohibiting extradition of persons who might be
subject to capital punishment in the requesting country.").
150. Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and Japan,
March 3, 1978, U.S.-Japan, art. VI, para 1, 31 U.S.T.892, 897. Note also that
the requesting nation may use the nationality theory of jurisdiction when appropri-
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This language expressly prevents the "special use" of dual criminality from foiling otherwise valid extradition attempts as long
as the nation has somehow proscribed the conduct, such as
through the 1986 antiterrorism law.
2. Alter the objective territoriality basis of jurisdiction by
adding "Intent to Cause an EffectB
One method to make extradition of unsuccessful drug conspirators and terrorists possible would be to alter the requirements of the objective territoriality principle by adding that
any intent t o cause a harmful effect upon the requesting nation
would fulfill "special use" dual criminality obligations. This
approach was adopted by a United States court in Republic of
France v. Moghadam.15' There the court stated that "the
court may assert jurisdiction over a defendant whose acts were
done outside of the United States . . . [as long as] the intent to
cause a detrimental effect[is] clear."'"
The biggest advantage of this approach would be the removal of a penalty for apprehending criminals prior t o their
successful act. Under the current approach, if conspirators are
apprehended prior to the enactment of their scheme, there has
been no detrimental effect in the requesting State, and
therefore there can be no extradition under the traditional
bases of jurisdiction. If an intent element is added, as long as
the drug traffickers or terrorists intend to commit an act which
would detrimentally affect the requesting State, the "special
use" of dual criminality would not bar extradition if the perpetrators are caught prior to inflicting a harmfbl effect on the
requesting State.
Blakesley offers an alternative resolution. He suggests that
a hybrid theory be adopted which would allow extraterritorial
jurisdiction to '%e properly asserted if the offense charged
meets all but one of the requirements of any two or more traditional bases of jurisdiction, even though it does not meet all the
requirements of any single theory . . . ."lmHi s a p p r o ac h i s
ate.
151. 617 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Cal. 1985). The court nevertheless determined that
extradition in this case would be improper because no such showing of intent was
made.
152. Id. at 787 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
153. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 723.
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problematic, however, because as noted, nations may not accept
one of the traditional theories of jurisdiction, and even if they
do, their conceptualization of the theory may differ from State
to State. Therefore, a hybrid jurisdictional basis acceptable to
the requesting nation may still be rejected by the requested
nation under dual criminality's "special use."
I t would be much easier to simply alter the theory most
acceptable to all nations-the tefiitorial theory-as suggested
above.'" If this alteration were limited to instances of common interest, such as international drug traffcking and terrorism, even those nations which currently do not accept the liberal objective territoriality theory in all instances may be persuaded to accept it in these limited, but important, circumstances.

The dual criminality requirement has served the purposes
for which it was created-protection of individual rights. But
when strictly interpreted, it has become a hindrance to achieving the policies underlying extradition itself, such as the suppression of international crimes of drug trafficking and terrorism. Because the prosecution of these crimes is in both the
national and international interests, the dual criminality requirement should be relaxed.'% However, the requirement
should not be eliminated because the requirement does protect
certain political interests of nations while preserving important
rights of the accused.

Jonathan 0.Hafen

154. BASSIOUNI,
supra note 11, at 254 ("The theory of territorial jurisdiction [is]
often referred to as the territorial principle because of its universal recognition . . . This principle, more than any other, is a concomitant of sovereignty;
and, therefore, all states adhere to the territorial principle.").
155. In addition to the comments throughout this paper supporting liberalization
of the dual criminality requirement, see International Legal Notes: Extradition and
the Proper Scope of the Principle of Doubk Criminality, 54 ATJSFL.LJ. 240 (1980)
(supporting a liberal reading of the dual criminality reqyjrement).
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